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Foreword 
This report is part of the PESETA IV project analysing the impacts of climate change. It focuses on energy and 
more specifically on power production. Extreme meteorological events are considered in other PESETA IV 
tasks, such as floods, droughts or wind storms. This report rather focuses on the impacts of monthly or 
seasonal climate tendencies on electricity production.  
 2 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank Jonathan Spinoni for computing the wind speeds at the European scale, Alessandro 
Dosio for computing the bias-corrected temperature data and Bernard Bisselink for the hydrological 
simulations. We thank Paul Hasenohr for making a remote connection to the JRC Earth Observation Data and 
Processing Platform work. We also thank Luc Feyen and Juan-Carlos Ciscar for providing feedback and 
comments on the report and for their management role in the PESETA IV project. 
Authors 
Després, Jacques 
Adamovic, Marko 
 
 3 
Executive summary 
PESETA IV assesses the impacts of climate change on electricity production by hydro, wind, solar, 
nuclear and other thermal power plants, including biomass, coal, gas and oil. We assess these 
impacts in the present power system and in 2050 for a dynamic scenario in line with 2°C 
mitigation efforts. Both scenarios show that, at EU-level, the production of hydropower plants 
increases with global warming thanks to higher water availability (although this does not imply 
substantial development of new hydro plants), while nuclear power decreases. However, there are 
regional differences in the impacts, such as increased hydro production in the North, and a decline 
in hydro- and nuclear power production in southern Europe due to lower water availability for 
direct production or for cooling river-based plants. In northern Europe, the increasing availability 
of cheaper hydro results in substitution effects and lower production costs, while in southern 
Europe production costs could increase. Based on the modelling methodology used and the latest 
available climate simulations, the direct impacts of climate change on wind and solar production 
are not significant at EU-level. However, in the 2050 power system their capacity would increase 
in southern regions to compensate for the lost hydro and nuclear production. Climate change 
impacts on energy in the rest of the world show a negligible spill-over effect on Europe. Improved 
cooling technologies have the potential to reduce strongly the negative effects of water scarcity, 
particularly for nuclear plants in southern Europe. 
 
Energy production, transport and demand are impacted by climate change in several forms: temperatures, 
winds, precipitations, water discharge and extreme events (European Environment Agency, 2019). While 
PESETA III focused on climate change impacts on energy demand, in this PESETA IV report we estimate the 
effects of climate change on electricity production, at the seasonal time-scale and national or regional 
geographical aggregation. Of course, extreme events like floods, droughts or windstorms can lead to temporal 
disruption of electricity production, transmission or demand, but they are out of the scope of this report. 
Impacts on electricity production 
Global warming results in an overall increase in hydropower production from the EU + UK plants, especially in 
northern regions that rely heavily on hydropower plants. On the contrary, nuclear power reduces significantly, 
while other energy sources are only moderately impacted (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Climate change impact on power production in Europe 
Median values of climate ensembles. Impacts of 1.5, 2 and 3°C global warming imposed on today’s power system (static 
mode), and impacts in the 2050 power system in line with a 2°C mitigation scenario (dynamic scenario, including 
socioeconomic and energy sector evolution), with and without adaptation of water cooling. Note: "other thermal" 
designates biomass, coal, gas and oil plants. 
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When assuming a static 2020 power system, hydropower production in the EU is expected to increase by 
0.9% with 1.5°C global warming (median value) and by 2.3% and 3.2% with 2 and 3°C warming respectively. 
Nuclear production would decrease by 0.5% with 1.5°C warming and by 1.8% in a 3°C warming static 
scenario. Other thermal, wind and solar plants are barely impacted in the 2020 static study and at EU + UK 
level. 
In a separate analysis with dynamic scenarios, climate mitigation is assumed in line with a 2°C scenario (see 
the Approach section below). Therefore, the 2050 power system is modified and progressively impacted by 
climate change. When comparing results in 2050 with and without climate impacts, hydropower production 
increases by 3.3%, pushing out nuclear (-2.8%) and other thermal production (-0.6%). Wind and solar develop 
more (+1.1% for wind and +0.7% for solar at EU + UK level), mainly in response to the lack of hydro and 
nuclear production in southern Europe. The evolution of the mix is in itself an adaptation of the system to 
climate change. 
The overall increase in hydropower is dominated by northern European countries that rely heavily on 
hydropower and benefit from an increasing water availability. Since hydro has a lower marginal cost, it 
undercuts the demand in these regions for power from other energy sources. Depending on the local 
electricity production mix, the substitution effect is different. In the static scenarios, hydro mainly replaces 
biomass in Sweden, coal in Finland, oil in Lithuania and gas in Latvia. This leads to annual economic benefits 
in northern Europe of around 1.3 €billion (2015 values) with 3°C warming.  
In southern regions of Europe, and particularly the Iberian Peninsula, the projected reduction in water 
availability negatively affects hydro and nuclear production, especially in summer. Thermal plants act as a 
substitute to hydro and nuclear in the Iberian Peninsula: in order to meet demand in periods of reduced hydro 
and nuclear power, the thermal power capacities in reserve (e.g. combined cycle gas with CCS) have to 
increase production. This is more expensive than hydro and nuclear power generation, which means that 
production costs in southern Europe increase by around 0.9 €billion per year (2015 values) with 3°C warming 
assuming a static 2020 power system. In the dynamic scenarios, this effect is less pronounced because the 
increased development of wind and solar contributes to filling the gap left by hydro and nuclear. 
Based on the 11 climate runs, the uncertainty on water availability is important in Central Europe South, 
resulting in important variations in electricity production of all sources. Southern and northern Europe also 
have significant uncertainties but with consistent directions of change. Central Europe North, UK and Ireland 
show overall limited climate change impacts.  
Adaptation  
In the dynamic scenarios, the mix evolves in response to climate change impacts (e.g. increased wind and 
solar installations). Allowing adaptation of nuclear and other thermal plants leads to a different evolution of 
the mix. Nuclear production is particularly reactive and climate change impacts can be almost completely 
avoided with a switch to less water-intensive cooling technologies (reduction of -0.6% instead of -2.8%, see 
Figure 1). This mostly takes place in Central South Europe and Southern Europe, allowing a drastic reduction 
of water-constrained periods. Other thermal plants do not show a similar benefit from these adaptation 
measures, either because they do not operate at full capacity (reserve capacities can compensate for local 
constraints) or because they are already using efficient cooling technologies. 
Spill-over effects  
The spill-over effects from the rest of the world on EU + UK are also quantified (in “static mode”) and appear 
negligible (less than 0.1%). The main impact at global level is a decrease in fuel consumption and fuel prices 
because of lower heating demand in buildings. Lower fuel prices could potentially create a slight increase of 
demand in Europe, supplied by reserve capacities of thermal plants as well as some additional decentralised 
solar capacities. 
Implications 
Results of this study suggest that energy policies should consider climate change impacts in their electric 
capacity planning. With global warming, hydropower plants will become even more valuable assets in central 
and northern Europe thanks to increased water availability in these regions. On the other hand, in the south of 
Europe (especially the Iberian Peninsula and Greece), reduced water availability will reduce the available 
capacity of hydropower as well as nuclear and thermal plants. Adaptation, through the upgrade to less water-
intensive cooling technologies, could avoid most of the loss in capacity, especially for nuclear plants currently 
based on once-through river cooling. In northern Europe, nuclear and thermal production could be undermined 
by an increase in lower-cost hydropower production. Finally, wind and solar do not appear to be constrained 
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directly by climate impacts and could benefit from the negative effects on other technologies, especially 
during summer periods in southern regions. Expanding inter-regional electricity interconnections is a way to 
balance the evolving production patterns across Europe and their associated costs. For example, with 2°C 
global warming applied to the current power system, electricity production costs could decrease by 2.5% in 
northern Europe and increase by 0.6% in southern Europe as a consequence of the changes in water 
resources and hydropower production, if no additional trade occurs. 
Limitations 
Impacts on individual technologies are not assessed separately but as a system. Smaller impacts on some 
technologies (for example, wind and solar) can then be dominated by other impacts (demand and prices 
evolution, variations of other technology).  
The energy supply assessment does not incorporate the effects of climate extremes due to the temporal 
(seasonal) and spatial (country) resolution of the energy analysis. The drought analysis in PESETA IV shows 
that increasing drought conditions with global warming in southern and western regions of Europe will result 
in growing economic losses in the energy sector. Further, increased river and coastal flooding could result in 
higher direct damages to energy infrastructures in flood-prone areas. 
This study assumes that hydropower plants are not saturated most of the year and that they can benefit 
linearly from increasing water resources. Similarly, the average wind speeds used here impact linearly wind 
power production. Although a single turbine has a typical (non-linear) power curve, the relation is more 
difficult to characterize once the plants of a country are aggregated. The temperature effect on solar PV 
panels does not reflect the (non-linear) heat accumulation effect, which could result in higher efficiency 
losses than when considering the ambient temperature. Finally, the water temperature estimation is based on 
a linear relation with air temperature and lacks a more detailed spatial and temporal modelling. 
Approach 
PESETA IV estimates the effects of climate change on electricity production by hydro, wind, solar, nuclear and 
other thermal power plants (biomass, coal, gas and oil). Extreme events such as floods, droughts or 
windstorms can lead to a temporal disruption of electricity production, transmission or demand. Impacts of 
drought on energy production have been quantified in the drought analysis of PESETA IV. However, the 
required temporal and geographical detail is not compatible with the long-term system-wide analysis 
performed here with the energy model POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems). Climate 
change projections (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 pathways) and hydrological simulations are identical to those used in 
the PESETA IV tasks on water resources, droughts and river floods. The impacts assessed relate to changes in 
water resources availability for hydropower and cooling nuclear and other thermal plants, changes in wind 
resources for wind energy and changes in temperature for the efficiency of solar panels1. Results are obtained 
by comparing scenarios with and without the climate impacts on electricity production, so that other factors 
are neutralized (e.g. climate impacts on energy demand are modelled but not shown here). 
A number of different scenarios have been considered. A first analysis looks at the impacts of 1.5, 2 and 3°C 
global warming on the 2020 power system (energy model used in “static mode”), in order to neutralize other 
effects such as climate policy or natural power mix evolution. In this “static mode” we further quantified spill-
over effects on the EU caused by climate change impacts on energy production in the rest of the world. The 
energy model was also run in dynamic scenarios until 2050 corresponding to 2°C compatible mitigation 
efforts and emission pathway (RCP4.5, with stabilized radiative forcing at 4.5 Watts per square metre in 
2100, without ever exceeding that value) and a changing technical and socioeconomic context according to 
the ECFIN 2015 Ageing Report. In this dynamic setting we then quantified the potential of open recirculating 
cooling (evaporating towers) and dry cooling to reduce the negative effects of climate change on thermal 
plants cooling.  
  
                                           
1 Other climate change impacts cannot be studied by lack of data or unclear dynamics. For example, cloud cover influences solar 
production but the climate science of clouds is still too uncertain. 
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1 Introduction 
The energy sector faces climate change impacts in the production, transformation, transport and consumption 
of energy. Studying these impacts is crucial for evaluating and designing adequate mitigation and adaptation 
policies in order to minimize the negative consequences of climate change. Ciscar and Dowling (2014) looked 
at how impact assessment models represent these impacts. The PESETA IV project builds on the literature by 
bringing together different sectoral analyses of the impacts of climate change in Europe. 
On the energy supply aspects, a change in water availability can change hydro production patterns or cause 
decreased thermal production efficiency (van Vliet, 2016). Other indirect impacts, such as agricultural yields 
can influence bioenergy prices and development throughout the world. The report of the European 
Environment Agency on the topic (EEA, 2019) included coverage of biofuel supply as well as the impacts of 
some extreme weather and climate-related events on infrastructure: coastal and inland flooding, ice, snow 
and maritime storms, hail and lightning, wildfire events, thawing permafrost. Indeed, extreme events 
represent a disruption risk for critical infrastructures such as energy (Forzieri et al., 2018). They can 
experience strong impacts linked to gradual shifts in climatic conditions: oil and gas refineries (potentially 
facing extreme heat or water scarcity), pipelines (with risks of damage in areas of thawing permafrost such 
as Russia or Alaska) or maritime routes (e.g. the Northern Sea route could open in the Arctic Sea) are 
examples. Electricity networks can also lose part of their rating capacity due to increased temperatures. Heavy 
precipitations are projected to increase (including in regions with lower precipitations on average, like southern 
Europe) and entail flooding risks (COACCH 2019). The PESETA IV report on river and coastal floods in a 
warming world identify a massive increase of damages that also concern energy infrastructures. According to 
the PESETA IV report on droughts, the energy sector bears 23% of drought damages inflicted under present 
climate conditions (1981-2010). The PESETA IV report on wind and windstorms does not indicate a consistent 
increase in risks linked with global warming. The latest climate models used in PESETA IV do not show a link 
between global warming and extreme winds across Europe (some regions see more windstorms while others 
would face less of them). Accordingly, the current risk on the energy sector would not increase (besides the 
evolution of the energy sector exposure). Energy demand will evolve in response to a warming climate, with 
less heating and more cooling energy demand. This will result in less demand for heating fuels such as oil and 
gas and more demand for electricity, as shown in the PESETA III energy report (Kitous and Després, 2018).  
Climate change impacts will affect the existing system, especially if no adaptation measures are adopted. 
New infrastructure could be designed more resilient and located at more favourable places than current 
assets. However, given the longevity of energy infrastructures, a reinforcement against climate extremes 
could be necessary. For example, water retention areas could reduce flood peaks and dykes could protect 
particular assets. Increasing windstorm forecast accuracy and wind-proofing the relevant infrastructures 
(mainly electricity grid) could enhance the asset protection and resilience. More generally, the risk 
management of extreme events require emergency communication and action plans in disaster situations. For 
power plants, the adoption of less water-intensive cooling technologies, such as open-recirculating cooling or 
dry cooling, can reduce risks of forced outage. Seawater cooling can also be an option for adequately situated 
plants. 
While the focus of the PESETA III energy report was on residential demand for heating and cooling energy, 
this report considers instead the impacts on electricity production and the corresponding adaptation options. 
Like in the PESETA III project, the study is based on multiple climate models from the EURO-CORDEX dataset 
(11 instead of 5 in PESETA III, see annex 1). In this study, the climate-forcing scenario RCP (Representative 
Concentration Pathway) 4.5 is added to the previously studied RCP 8.5 (stabilized radiative forcing at 
maximum values of 4.5 or 8.5 Watts per square metre in 2100). This addition allows studying a more diverse 
range of climate change possibilities and further illustrating the uncertainty and diversity in modelling results.  
The modelling tool used, POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems, see Annex 2), allows 
evaluating impacts on yearly energy demand, and has been substantially modified to include impacts on 
electricity production. Already in the PESETA II project, Dowling (2013) studied the impact of several climate 
change scenarios from different Global Climate Models (GCM) at the European scale. The focus of this study 
was on residential and service energy needs for heating and cooling, as well as the thermal power plants 
efficiency loss linked to increased temperatures and the changes in renewable production (hydro, wind and 
solar). Mima and Criqui (2015) looked at the European impacts of climate change within the ClimateCost 
project, country by country. It included an evaluation not only of the increase of cooling needs and decrease of 
heating needs, but also of the variations in water resource availability for hydropower and the decreased 
thermal production availability and efficiency due to increased temperatures. The energy-water nexus is 
examined in the USA and Europe (van Vliet et al., 2012). Some integrated management of water reservoirs 
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and energy system were carried out for Greece with the LISFLOOD and DISPA-SET models to evaluate the 
power and water inter-linkages in dry, average or wet years (Fernández-Blanco et al., 2017). The "Water – 
Energy nexus in Europe" report (Magagna et al., 2019) used the same hydrological data as our study with 
different indicators, focusing on the future water needs of several energy sectors including the power sector. 
It also showed the water availability at hydro and thermal plants with the evolution of low river flow and an 
index of water stress at the power plant level across Europe. 
The new POLES developments in the context of PESETA IV allow studying the impacts of climate change on 
power plant availability and production, for hydro, thermal (including nuclear), wind and solar photovoltaic 
(PV) plants. Adaptation of thermal plants is also considered. The climate data used as input to POLES, 
identical to other PESETA IV sectoral studies, are air temperatures (Dosio, 2018), wind speeds and water 
runoff in rivers, which are produced in the PESETA IV water task with the hydrological model LISFLOOD 
(Bisselink et al., 2018). This new energy-water linkage relies on current power plant locations for calibration, 
instead of considering national averages as in the previous PESETA studies. This study takes into account non-
linear environmental constraints on river temperatures and runoff, instead of a linear approximation (Mima 
and Criqui, 2015). Besides, the POLES model ensures a system-wide analysis of the energy sector: the 
balance between supply, prices and demand is ensured in the whole energy sector. All electricity-producing 
technologies are inter-linked. The electricity mix can evolve in POLES dynamic scenarios, which can be seen as 
a way of adapting to evolving conditions such as climate change. Global effects on Europe are tested in a 
“spill-over” analysis using the global climate change ISIMIP Fast-track database.  
All results are presented for Europe as well as its five reporting regions; thus lessens the weight of small-
scale effects.  
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2 Methodology 
While PESETA III studied the climate change impacts on energy demand only, PESETA IV looks at (some of) 
the impacts on power supply (van Vliet et al., 2016, Tobin et al., 2018) – cf. annex 3.  
The climate impacts considered are chosen based on their relevance and compatibility with a system-wide, 
dynamic analysis. Solar panels are affected by the outside temperatures (affine function) because a warmer 
weather reduces their efficiency (Dowling, 2013). Wind and hydro power production are linearly dependent on 
respectively wind speeds and river water discharge at hydro plants2, averaged at the seasonal scale. Nuclear 
and other thermal plants (coal, gas, oil and biomass) can be constrained by reduced water availability for 
cooling when they use river cooling (non-linear relation with an approximated threshold effect). River runoffs 
and water temperatures (see Mima and Criqui, 2015) are compared with cooling needs, which depend on the 
technology and energy source. In hot and/or dry conditions, the thermal plants may have to reduce output or 
shut down completely, as recent examples show (Reuters, 2019). Other climate drivers may be relevant (e.g. 
cloud cover for solar power) but are too uncertainty or unavailable, so they cannot be quantified here. 
The 11 climate models of the EURO-CORDEX database (described in Annex 1) are used, combined with two 
sets of climate projections (RCP 4.5 and 8.5). They provide temperature3, wind speeds and water availability in 
gridded maps. The LISFLOOD model (Van Der Knijff et al., 2010) computes the river runoffs in the PESETA IV 
water task, with evolving land use and water demand throughout the century (Bisselink et al., 2018). For the 
analysis of global spill-over effects we use the ISIMIP Fast-track data, with five climate models, combined 
with RCP 4.5 and 8.5 and with five hydrological models (see annex 1 and 3).  
The energy impacts are derived with the energy system model POLES, which has the advantage of covering 
the world and offers the possibility to look at dynamic scenarios throughout the century. The spatial 
disaggregation is at country level and the temporal detail allows a seasonal approach. This limits the scope of 
results compared to more specialised but shorter-term, local models. POLES cannot study well weekly or sub-
national (extreme) weather events but rather focuses on climate tendencies with monthly or seasonal 
patterns and on national and international energy balances between supply and demand. However, the 
impacts of drought are quantified in the dedicated PESETA IV report based on the relative economical weight 
of the energy sector. The floods and wind reports also quantify impacts, for example showing that wind 
extremes are not expected to increase consistently, which is relevant for the safety of future wind turbines. 
The available data has to be adapted by aggregating spatially and temporally. Spatial matrixes of weighting 
coefficients (rasters) represent population (for the aggregation of temperatures), current and potential future 
wind plants (for wind speeds) and current hydro and thermal plants (for river runoffs at hydro, nuclear, coal, 
oil, gas and biomass plants respectively). The weighting factor uncertainty is assumed to be negligible. The 
temporal description of the POLES model distinguishes summer, winter or swing seasons within six 
representative days per annual time-step. The seasonal variations of the climate data impacts the infra-
annual availability of power plants. Extreme and short events (sub-monthly dynamics) like droughts, floods or 
windstorms can imply short-term disruptions of energy production but are not considered under this analysis. 
First we present static scenarios of the 1.5, 2 and 3 degree warming levels, everything else maintained equal 
(2020’s power system and socio-economic conditions, no climate change mitigation nor adaptation, constant 
water use). We apply this to Europe only and to the whole world in order to see the magnitude of spill-over 
effects. Then we present a 2-degree scenario (mitigation effort consistent with 2 degree warming at global 
level, RCP 4.5 climate scenario in Europe) in a dynamic context, where electricity demand and supply evolve 
along the century4. An adaptation option is then added, consisting of a technology switch of thermal plant 
cooling system, going from once-through systems to recirculating towers or dry cooling. 
In order to neutralize other effects (e.g. energy demand, mitigation or adaptation efforts, evolution of the 
production mix), the impacts shown are from a scenario comparison with and without climate change impacts 
on electricity production.   
                                           
2 This assumes a simplification of the wind power curve at national scale and that water spillage in flooding 
periods comes in the same proportion as today. 
3 Temperatures are bias-adjusted (Dosio and Paruolo, 2011, Dosio et al., 2012, Dosio, 2016, Dosio, 2018, 
Dosio and Fischer 2018). 
4 The geographical distribution of plants within each country is assumed constant across the century by lack 
of better assumptions. Note that this reduces the adaptation potential. 
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3 Findings 
First we present scenarios of climate change impacts on today’s electricity production, with potential rest-of-
the-world spill-over effects. Then we present scenarios of climate change impacts in a dynamic scenario, for 
the year 2050. Finally, the adaptation of the cooling technology is allowed in the simulation. 
3.1 Impacts of climate change on today’s electricity production 
The climate change impacts on (2020) electricity production are diverse across the continent. We analyse the 
main results below, from North to South, as shown in Figure 2 (for Europe as a whole and by region).  
In Northern Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden) we note a strong increase in 
water availability (especially in winter and swing seasons) that is correlated with hydro power production. 
Since most nuclear plants are located on sea-shores (Sweden, Finland) with abundant supplies of water, we 
do not observe any simulated impact on the nuclear production in POLES, despite the presence of hotter days 
that could still lead to some cooling limitations. On the other hand, thermal plants are indirectly affected 
because the lower marginal costs of hydro power undercut the demand for electricity from thermal electricity 
sources. The local electricity mix determines what energy source production is replaced by hydropower: 
biomass in Sweden, coal in Finland, oil in Lithuania, gas in Latvia. Coal plants in Estonia are affected by the 
higher water temperatures but being the main electricity source, they use their spare capacity to compensate. 
UK and Ireland face no major impact. The general higher water availability does not impact the power 
system substantially since the installed hydropower capacity is small. Besides, the temperature and wind 
speeds effects are negligible. 
In Central Europe North (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Luxembourg), there is also an increase of 
hydro production linked to the projected increase in water availability in all seasons and especially winter and 
swing seasons. However, the impact on the power system is small since hydropower only represents 3.6% of 
the regional electricity mix. The other electricity sources are marginally impacted (around 0.5% or less at 2 
degree warming), mainly due to increased temperatures (effects on solar efficiency) or lower summer river 
runoff in some scenarios (impact on availability of German coal).  
In Central Europe South (Austria, Czechia, France, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania) the water availability is on 
average projected to increase, although there are large variations across the different climate models' 
projections. Hydropower production is strongly correlated with water availability and follows this pattern. 
Nuclear power plants are also affected and characterized by a reduction in their summer production in some 
scenarios. This is mainly due to the adverse effect of reduced streamflow on cooling water demand (e.g. in 
France, Romania and Czechia) or to impact of higher water temperatures (e.g. in Hungary). While thermal 
plants face the same cooling constraints, they can still replace the missing hydro and nuclear production due 
to their excess electric generation capacity.  
Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain) are projected to 
experience an overall decrease of water availability. While the Iberian Peninsula faces across-the-board 
decreases in water availability, these losses are scenario-dependant in Greece and Bulgaria. Spanish nuclear 
plants and Greek lignite plants are projected to reduce their production due to reductions in river runoff, 
particularly in summer. Water temperatures also limit the availability of thermal plants in the hottest summer 
days because of environmental regulations. The consequence of these reduced productions is that other 
(more expensive) thermal plants increase their production in order to meet the electricity demand. These 
plants also have to face the reduced water availability for cooling, but they compensate by using their 
existing excess capacity (e.g. in Spain, Portugal and Greece). On the other hand, water availability, and thus 
hydro production, is projected to increase in Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. Gas plants are not needed as much to 
meet demand and decrease their production. Finally, Cyprus, Malta and Croatia face hotter summers with 
higher water temperatures but no impact on the rest of the system is projected since abundant cooling water 
is available from the sea. 
The common characteristics across Europe are that wind and solar plants are not projected to experience 
large impacts of climate change. Climate models project only small changes in wind speeds (Tobin et al., 
2015, Tobin et al., 2016). This result should be viewed with some caution due to the complexity of modelling 
wind speeds in climate models, for example considering their rather coarse spatial resolution. Projected 
temperature increases have a limited impact on solar production that is compensated for by the energy mix 
effect, in that all energy sources of the electricity mix need to add up to the demand and some other 
electricity sources (hydro, nuclear) face much stronger impacts that dwarf the wind or solar impacts. Other 
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studies (Jerez et al., 2015), which examine all drivers of PV productivity (including irradiation linked to cloud 
cover) do not project consistent change either in any direction. 
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Figure 2: Climate change impacts on 2020’s electricity production by energy source in Europe, by region 
To read the figure, note that "thermal" designates biomass, coal, gas and oil plants' production. The scenarios 
represented are based on 11 climate models, with RCP 4.5 (compatible with 1.5 and 2 degree warming levels) 
and RCP 8.5 (used for 1.5, 2 and 3 degree warming levels). Dots indicate the extreme scenarios; vertical lines 
indicate the spread of all other points; coloured areas indicate the two middle quartiles separated by the 
median line. All effects other than climate impact on electricity supply are neutralized; only the relative 
differences of production of each electricity source are shown. 
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To summarize Figure 2, we observe an increase of EU hydro production, particularly in Northern Europe, where 
thermal plants have to reduce their production. Central Europe and the British Isles see a slight increase of 
hydro but no other sizeable impact. Inter-model variations of projections are important for hydro production in 
Central South and Southern Europe. In the former, thermal plant production is also quite uncertain. In the 
later, nuclear plants are somewhat impacted by water scarcity and thermal plants make up for the lost 
production by using their existing reserve capacities. Wind and solar productions face moderate and uncertain 
impacts.  
Total electricity production costs with today's power mix are not significantly impacted by climate change if 
the whole of Europe is considered (respectively +0.0%, +0.0% and -0.1% for 1.5, 2 and 3 degree scenarios, 
equivalent to +0.2, +0.2 and -0.3 €billion (2015 values), but there are regional variations. The annual 
economic benefits are concentrated in Northern Europe (respectively -0.2, -0.7 and -1.2 €billion annually 
(2015 values), i.e. -0.8%, -2.5% and -3.8% for 1.5, 2 and 3 degree scenarios) due to the increased 
hydropower resource. On the other hand, Southern Europe faces additional costs due to the need to replace 
some of its hydro and nuclear power with more expensive thermal production (respectively +0.3, +0.7 and 
+0.8 €billion annually (2015 values), i.e. +0.3%, +0.6% and +0.7% for 1.5, 2 and 3 degree scenarios). 
3.2 Rest-of-the-world spill-over effects on Europe 
In this section, we study the additional impacts caused on the EU power production because of climate 
change impacts in the rest of the world. The range of climate impacts considered is the same as in the 
previous section. Therefore, some important impacts are out of scope, such as impacts on energy 
infrastructure (e.g. permafrost thawing on pipeline routes, impacts of extreme events on energy supply 
disruptions). International impacts on agriculture are not assessed either, despite their potential impact on the 
price of biomass for EU imports and use in biomass power plants (for example, UK has imported some USA 
biomass for its power plants by lack of local resource). 
We compare European power production (by source) with European-only climate impacts and with global 
climate impacts. We carry out two sets of scenarios with the same climate simulations (ISIMIP fast-track, see 
Annex 1), where the only difference is that climate change is applied to Europe only or to the whole world. We 
show below the differential effects, so that the differences in the European power supply (see Figure 3) are 
purely due to the spill-over effects of non-EU climate change impacts. 
Figure 3: Indirect impacts on European electricity production from climate change in the rest of the world, by 
energy source 
To read the figure, note that "thermal" designates biomass, coal, gas and oil plants' production. The scenarios 
represented are based on 42 climate models, 17 with RCP 4.5 (compatible with 1.5 and 2 degree warming 
levels) and 25 with RCP 8.5 (used for 1.5, 2 and 3 degree warming levels). Dots indicate the extreme 
scenarios; vertical lines indicate the spread of all other scenarios; coloured areas indicate the two middle 
quartiles. All effects other than climate change impacts on non-EU regions are cancelled out; only the relative 
differences of production of each electricity source in the EU are shown. 
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In Figure 3 we see how non-EU climate impacts cause a slight increase of thermal and solar electricity 
production in EU, less than 0.1%. Other sources of electricity are not substantially impacted. 
The interactions between EU and the rest of the world are multiple. We focus here on the fuel prices (see 
Figure 4, left) to try explaining the small variations of electricity production in Europe (other factors could be 
biomass and biofuel prices and supply to Europe).  
Non-EU climate change reduces energy demand and fuel prices. This is due to lower heating demand in 
countries like China or the USA that have less cold winters. This effect prevails over the increase of cooling 
demand in other regions, in part because the cooling technologies (air conditioning) are not yet widely 
developed. The lower prices lead to higher industrial, residential and services demand in Europe (see Figure 4 
right).  
Figure 4: Indirect impacts on global fossil fuel prices (left) and European electricity price and demand in the 
residential and service sectors (right) from climate change in the rest of the world  
To read the figure, note that "thermal" designates biomass, coal, gas and oil plants' production. The scenarios 
represented are based on 42 climate models, 17 with RCP 4.5 (compatible with 1.5 and 2 degree warming 
levels) and 25 with RCP 8.5 (used for 1.5, 2 and 3 degree warming levels). Dots indicate the extreme 
scenarios; vertical lines indicate the spread of all other scenarios; coloured areas indicate the two middle 
quartiles. All effects other than climate change impacts on non-EU regions are cancelled out; only the relative 
differences of prices and electricity consumption in the EU are shown. 
 
The left panel of Figure 4 shows that most climate models lead to lower global fuel prices, with large 
variations across scenarios. This is due to decreased oil and gas demand for heating. (Oil is more sensitive 
than gas because it does not benefit from the increase of electricity demand for cooling.) Coal prices are not 
impacted. The overall decrease of global fuel prices, particularly gas, leads to a slight decrease of electricity 
prices in EU of about 0.1% (Figure 4, right panel).  
This leads to a slight increase of consumption in EU (around 0.05%) that is in priority covered with existing 
reserve capacities (non-nuclear thermal plants). Indeed, thermal plants have higher variable costs than hydro 
or nuclear plants. Therefore they are the adjustment variable. Decentralised solar plants also develop slightly 
more because the additional demand is favourable to new installations of decentralised solar. 
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3.3 Impacts of climate change in 2050 under a 2-degree scenario 
This section presents the dynamic results of POLES. The climate change impacts now have retroactive effects 
on the demand and supply of electricity. During the scenario evolution, climate change affects energy demand 
directly through an evolving heating technology mix and installation of cooling equipment (air conditioning), 
but also indirectly through changing energy prices in response to climate effects on supply. Climate change 
also influences electricity capacity investments, directly through different resource availabilities (as in the 
previous section) and indirectly through different expectations of future energy demand (changing electricity 
needs and load profile). On top of the climate impacts, the scenarios follow the ECFIN 2015 Ageing Report5 
(Ciscar et al. 2017) for population and economic growth. Some technologies develop (decentralised 
photovoltaics) or appear (carbon capture and sequestration), while climate policies are applied. Climate 
change impacts the relative value of electric plants and thus their development. All these interactions, 
visualised in Figure 5, modify the energy mix and make it challenging to interpret precisely what impacts are 
caused specifically by climate change.  
Figure 5: Multiple interactions in the dynamic model POLES 
 
As in the previous section on the theoretical impacts of climate change on today’s system, counter-factual 
scenarios where climate does not affect electricity production are used as comparison points. Here are the 
results detailed by energy source (see also Figure 7). 
We observe an overall increase of water resource and hydro production in EU + UK (median value of +3.3% 
i.e. +14 TWh), counterbalanced by a decreasing nuclear production (-2.8%; -18 TWh). Other thermal plants are 
little affected over Europe (-0.6%; -4 TWh). Wind and solar power production increases slightly with climate 
impacts at EU + UK level (respectively +1.1%; +13 TWh and +0.7%; +7 TWh).  
If we decompose by region, we see the same patterns than in the static scenarios with higher variability of 
results in the dynamic scenarios. This is attributable to the higher degree of interactions of energy supply 
sources between themselves and with the level of demand. This illustrates different ways the electricity 
system can respond to the climate change impacts once multiple other aspects are factored in. 
Most of the hydro production increase is concentrated in Northern Europe (+9.6 TWh), thanks to an increased 
water availability. Central Europe North, UK and Ireland see little change in the hydro production. Central 
Europe South hydro production increase (+4.3 TWh) but is compensated by a decrease in Southern Europe (-
5.4 TWh). These two regions have a high variability of results across scenarios, around +/-10%. 
                                           
5 The population and growth projections were updated during PESETA IV project but were not incorporated by 
lack of time. These updated projections do not affect the main conclusions of this report. 
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Nuclear production decreases in Northern Europe (-4.6 TWh), penalized by the higher hydro production, and in 
Central Europe South (-4.0 TWh) and Southern Europe (-5.8 TWh), where, on the contrary, the drier conditions 
create water availability constraints (in France this happens mainly in summer but in Spain it happens 
throughout the year, see Figure 6). Nuclear in Central Europe North, UK and Ireland is little impacted. 
Figure 6: Fraction of electric capacities unaffected by climate change for a few affected countries in 2050 
Reading note: for 60 days of 2050, nuclear capacities are not affected by climate change, while for the most 
affected 60 days, their capacity is reduced by 16 to 20% in Spain. 
 
The situation for other thermal productions (coal, gas, oil and biomass) is the contrary of the hydropower 
situation. Northern Europe sees a decreased production (-3.0 TWh) caused by the higher role of hydro. Central 
Europe North, UK and Ireland face negligible impacts from climate change. Central Europe South thermal 
production decreases (-3.8 TWh), linked to the higher year-round hydro and wind production. On the contrary, 
Southern Europe thermal plants make up for the lost hydro and nuclear production (+3.9 TWh). 
The relative variations of wind and solar are relatively small (median values between -2.2% and +1.9% 
depending on the region). However, due to their increasing importance in the climate mitigation scenario, in 
absolute terms the production changes in 2050 are comparable to other electricity sources. In particular, wind 
and solar increase in Central Europe South (respectively +4.2 TWh and +1.5 TWh) and Southern Europe 
(respectively +4.0 TWh and +3.6 TWh), boosted by the restrictions on nuclear production due to a lack of 
cooling water. These two regions have variable results across scenarios, around +/-5%. This is due to many 
factors, including uncertainty on future wind speeds. In Northern Europe, Central Europe North, UK and Ireland 
the wind and solar production are almost not affected (less than 1 TWh of difference on average).  
Results for the year 20506 are presented in Figure 7. 
 
                                           
6 We note that some results are also sensitive to the year chosen (only 2050 is shown here). The POLES 
model is simulating possible trajectories (simulation model) with reactions delayed in time. Since, in the 
meantime, market and demand conditions have evolved, electricity production keeps adapting to 
imperfect future anticipations and never reach a stable state. Therefore, individual results are more 
difficult to interpret in a dynamic scenario. 
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Figure 7: Climate change impacts in 2050 production by energy source in a dynamic scenario, in Europe, by 
region, in relative (%) and absolute (TWh) terms 
Reading note: "thermal" designates biomass, coal, gas and oil plants' production. The scenarios represented 
are based on 11 climate models, with RCP 4.5 and climate mitigation action consistent with a global warming 
of 2 degrees. Dots indicate the four extreme scenarios; coloured areas indicate the other seven scenarios and 
the line is the median scenario. All effects other than climate impacts on electricity supply are neutralized; 
only the relative differences of production of each electricity source are shown. 
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Figure 7 shows overall similar climate change impacts in Europe (EU + UK) compared to the static scenarios 
of 2 or 3 degrees warming levels (see Figure 2). Hydro production is boosted at European level thanks to 
favourable climatic conditions in Northern Europe. Nuclear plants are constrained, either by too much water 
availability, because hydro power replaces them, or by too little water availability, as cooling needs are not 
covered and nuclear plants have to shut down. Other thermal plants are also pushed out in Northern Europe 
but make up for the lost hydro and nuclear production in Southern Europe. Wind and solar are developed 
faster because of climate impacts, mainly in Southern Europe. 
3.4 Adaptation of thermal plants to climate change, in 2050 under a 2-degree 
scenario 
The same dynamic scenario as in the previous section can include adaptation options. These reduce the 
observable climate change impacts while adding a variable in the mix (Figure 8). 
Figure 8: Interactions between demand, supply, climate and adaptation in the dynamic model POLES 
The adaptation options considered only apply to nuclear and other thermal plants. The climate change 
impacts on these plants are linked to the cooling technology used. The main technologies, which are 
represented in POLES, are once-through cooling (water is pumped in and out with a small temperature 
difference), open recirculating cooling (water is sprayed in cooling towers and the part not evaporated  is 
reused), sea-water cooling and dry cooling (air is moved by fans). In order to adapt to climate change and lack 
of cooling water, electric plants can move from once-through to open recirculating cooling, which reduces the 
water consumed, or to dry cooling that make the plants independent on the water availability at the expense 
of a reduced efficiency (linked to the electric consumption of the fans). Sea-water cooling can also be pushed 
slightly in countries which already have this possibility. Another possibility (not represented in POLES) is to 
combine technologies in a single plant, which brings more operational flexibility. 
The adaptation options of thermal plants reduces significantly the climate impacts, as shown in Figure 9. For 
example, the availability of nuclear reactors is improved by 2.8% in France, 4.8% in Czechia, 5.5% in Romania 
and 7.5% in Spain. 
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Figure 9: Fraction of unaffected nuclear capacities with adaptation options, in 2050 for some countries 
Reading note: for around 270 days of 2050, nuclear capacities are not affected by climate change, while for 
the most affected 60 days, their capacity is reduced by 3 to 6% in Spain. Greek lignite is not shown since 
capacities drop to near-zero by 2050 in the climate mitigation scenario. 
 
Hydro plants are not impacted by the adaptation options considered here. Nuclear electricity production is 
benefiting from adaptation options the most, with a median increase of production of 16 TWh (2.4%) at 
European scale. This leads to a different development of the electricity mix. Indeed, the increased nuclear 
production is balanced by a slight reduction of production from wind (-0.6%; -7.3 TWh) and solar (-0.3%; -
2.7 TWh) plants.  
The adaptation options have negligible impacts in Northern Europe, Central Europe North, UK & Ireland. The 
biggest changes due to adaptation are nuclear production in Central Europe South (+0.8%; +3.0 TWh) and 
Southern Europe (+4.8%; +4.6 TWh). The scenarios show variable results: adaptation allows nuclear 
production to increase by up to +29 TWh (+8%) in Central Europe South in the R5-G5 scenario and +22 TWh 
(+23%) in Southern Europe in the R5-G4 scenario.  
Water constraints leading to adaptation of other thermal production are less frequent than for nuclear plants. 
Most thermal plants already use open recirculating cooling, which consume small amounts of river water. 
However, the adaptation of nuclear plants influences negatively the production of other thermal plants, wind 
and solar, in particular in Southern Europe. Therefore, the variability between scenarios is also seen for other 
thermal (up to -6.5 TWh in Southern Europe), wind (up to -12 TWh in Central Europe South and -8.3 TWh in 
Southern Europe) and solar (up to -8.2 TWh in Central Europe South and -5.8 TWh in Southern Europe). 
All results combining climate change impacts and adaptation are shown by energy source and by region in 
Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Impacts of climate change with adaptation in 2050, by energy source in a dynamic scenario, by 
region, in relative (%) and absolute (TWh) terms 
Reading note: "thermal" designates biomass, coal, gas and oil plants' production. The scenarios represented 
are based on 11 climate models, with RCP 4.5 and climate mitigation action consistent with a global warming 
of 2 degrees. Dots indicate the four extreme scenarios; coloured areas indicate the other seven scenarios and 
the line is the median scenario. All effects other than climate impacts on electricity supply are neutralized; 
only the relative differences of production of each electricity source are shown. 
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When combining all aspects of climate impacts and adaptation in POLES scenarios, the main impact at 
European level is the increase in hydropower production (+3.3%; +14 TWh). This mainly comes from Northern 
Europe (+10%; +9.6 TWh) and shows a high variability in Central Europe South (from -7.2% to +21%; -11 to 
+32 TWh) and Southern Europe (from -18% to +9%; -26 to +12 TWh).  
Nuclear plants avoid excessive negative climate impacts by adapting their cooling technology. At European 
level the nuclear production is slightly reduced (-0.6%; -4.0 TWh), which can be linked to the Northern Europe 
situation (-5.0%; -3.4 TWh) where nuclear is pushed out by additional hydro production. In other regions, the 
impact of climate change is either negligible or compensated by changes in the mix of cooling technologies. 
The variability observed in EU + UK (-2.5% to +2.2%; -17 to +15 TWh) is mainly due to the diversity of 
climate scenario projections for France (where the difference between scenarios reaches a spread of 28 TWh), 
Czechia (4.3 TWh of spread) and Spain (spread of 7.9 TWh). 
Other thermal plants come out with moderate negative impacts (-0.7%; -5.4 TWh), driven by Northern Europe 
(-7.3%; +3.2 TWh) and Central Europe South (-3.0%; -2.8 TWh), impacted by the increased hydro production. 
Southern Europe, on the contrary, increases slightly its thermal production (+0.9%; +1.6 TWh), compensating 
for the loss of hydro production due to drier conditions. Other regions show little differences. 
Very moderate positive impacts are faced over EU + UK by wind (+0.4%; +4.6 TWh) and solar plants (+0.1%; 
+1.2 TWh). The variability of results can be highlighted (at EU + UK level, spread of 69 TWh for wind and 
22 TWh for solar), mainly in Central and Southern Europe.  
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4 Conclusions 
The study quantifies the impacts of climate change on electricity production, at the seasonal resolution, given 
the temporal and spatial detail of the analysis. The main message is that the electricity supply impacts are 
strongly linked to the evolution of water availability for hydro power and for thermal plant cooling. This is a 
clear example of the water-energy nexus.  
The higher hydro production (based on almost unaffected installed capacities) in the Northern countries 
reduces the need for nuclear and other thermal plants there, while lower water availability in Southern 
countries reduces production from hydro and nuclear plants. The power system then needs to fill the gap with 
other capacities: thermal plants in a static power system, complemented by higher wind and solar capacities 
in a dynamic scenario up to 2050. Adaptation of the cooling technology can reduce water scarcity impacts on 
nuclear plants in southern regions. This reduces the negative impacts on nuclear and thus the additional 
production of other capacities. The UK, Ireland and the northern central Europe (e.g. Germany) are not 
particularly affected due to their low sensitivity to hydro power.  
The direct impacts of climate change on wind and solar production seem small. The decreased PV panel 
efficiency due to higher temperatures is absorbed in the balancing of the power system mix, while wind 
speeds are not consistently changing. However, the dynamic scenario show higher installed capacities to make 
up for the lost production of other electricity sources in southern regions of Europe. 
The analysis overall suggests that national and local electricity planners should consider climate change 
impacts. With global warming, an increased water availability in centre and northern Europe will make 
hydropower plants even more valuable. At the same time, nuclear and thermal production could be 
undermined by an increase in lower-cost hydropower production. On the other hand, in the Iberian Peninsula 
and Greece, water availability decreases and droughts affect hydro plants as well as nuclear and thermal 
plants, by lack of cooling water. The water scarcity issues can be eliminated by adaptation, through the 
upgrade to less water-intensive cooling technologies, especially for nuclear plants currently based on once-
through river cooling. Wind and solar face small direct climate impacts; actually, in dynamic scenarios up to 
2050, they can increase capacities to compensate for the losses of hydro and nuclear in southern regions 
with water scarcity. The contrasted geographical patterns of climate change impacts across Europe reinforce 
the value of electricity interconnections. Indeed, the projected impacts with today’s power system represent 
important benefits in terms of power production costs for Northern Europe (-2.5% under a 2°C warming 
scenario), while climate change brings a small additional cost to Southern European power production costs 
(+0.6% for 2°C).  
The spill-over effects from the rest of the world on Europe are negligible. A close look points to lower fuel 
consumption in the rest of the world due to warmer winter and lower heating demand. This leads to slightly 
lower fuel prices, which marginally increase European power demand and the solar and thermal power 
production.  
The scope of this work had to be limited and has a number of limits. Despite integrating detailed water, 
temperature and wind speed data as inputs, the spatial and temporal resolution of the energy system model 
POLES reduces the analysis to seasonal tendencies. The effects of extreme events on power supply cannot be 
properly accounted within the POLES analysis. The links between infrastructures could lead to domino effects 
where one meteorological event affects the energy supply, which has rippling effects on other sectors like 
telecommunications. Global warming can lead to increased river and coastal flooding, resulting in higher 
direct damage to energy infrastructures in flood prone areas. The drought analysis of PESETA IV provides 
some estimates. Under the current climate (1981-2010), the expected annual losses to energy production due 
to drought damages in the EU reach around 2.2 €billion/year, and would rise to 3.3 €billion/year for 3°C global 
warming, assuming static economic conditions. When including dynamic projections of the economic 
importance of the energy sector, based on the 2015 Ageing Report and a reference scenario without 
mitigation, the annual losses amount to 8.7 €billion/year for 3°C global warming in 2100. There is a strong 
geographical imbalance in these projections. Drought losses in the energy sector will rise strongest in 
southern and western regions of the EU. In northern countries, droughts would be less frequent with global 
warming and drought impacts would decrease. According to the PESETA IV report on windstorms, there is no 
consensus on any climate-induced trend in windstorms over Europe (despite increasing windstorm frequencies 
over the last decades). Regionally, though, the slight tendencies indicate that wind extremes increase in 17% 
of the area of southern Europe at 3°C warming (region with the most impacted area). This could lead to 
disruption of electricity lines due to falling trees. Areas affected by wind extremes decrease by 24% in central 
western Europe (region most preserved). In parallel, the frequency of calm days (daily maximum wind speed 
below 3.5 m/s) increases in central Europe (West and East) for more than two thirds of the climate models. 
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However, the impacts of resources on electricity production also depend on the turbine locations. In this study, 
with limited spatial and temporal resolution, the impacts on the wind power production are considered 
negligible and too uncertain, compared to other electricity production impacts. Another limitation of this work 
is the modelling implementation, with some necessary linear approximations (see annex 3). Finally, the 
adaptation measures tested are limited. Some technical improvements in efficiency may also mitigate the 
adverse effects identified. For example, mixed cooling technologies including dry cooling offer more flexibility 
and avoid losing too much efficiency. Future works could include other adaptation options like geographical 
optimisation within countries to reduce the water scarcity impacts on thermal plants.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Scenario acronyms and time-windows around specific warming levels 
The EURO-CORDEX scenario characteristics are described in the table below. 
Table 1: EURO-CORDEX scenario used in PESETA IV with their years of specific warming levels 
Institute RCM (R) 
Driving 
GCM (G) 
CORDEX full name 
Acronym 
(R-G) 
1.5 C 2 C 3 C 
RCP 
4.5 
RCP 
8.5 
RCP 
4.5 
RCP 
8.5 
RCP 
8.5 
CLMcom CCLM4.8-17 
CNRM-
CERFACS-
CNRM-CM5 
CNRM-CERFACS-CNRM-
CM5_r1i1p1_CLMcom-CCLM4-8-17 
R1-G1 2035 2029 2057 2044 2067 
ICHEC-EC-
EARTH 
ICHEC-EC-EARTH_r12i1p1_CLMcom-
CCLM4-8-17 
R1-G2 2033 2026 2056 2041 2066 
MPI-M-MPI-
ESM-LR 
MPI-M-MPI-ESM-LR_r1i1p1_CLMcom-
CCLM4-8-17 
R1-G3 2034 2028 2064 2044 2067 
DMI HIRHAM5 
ICHEC-EC-
EARTH 
ICHEC-EC-EARTH_r3i1p1_DMI-HIRHAM5 R2-G2 2032 2028 2054 2043 2065 
IPSL-
INERIS 
WRF331F 
IPSL-IPSL-
CM5A-MR 
IPSL-IPSL-CM5A-MR_r1i1p1_IPSL-
INERIS-WRF331F 
R3-G4 2023 2021 2042 2035 2054 
KNMI RACMO22E 
ICHEC-EC-
EARTH 
ICHEC-EC-EARTH_r1i1p1_KNMI-
RACMO22E 
R4-G2 2032 2026 2056 2042 2065 
SMHI RCA4 
CNRM-
CERFACS-
CNRM-CM5 
CNRM-CERFACS-CNRM-
CM5_r1i1p1_SMHI-RCA4 
R5-G1 2035 2029 2057 2044 2067 
ICHEC-EC-
EARTH 
ICHEC-EC-EARTH_r12i1p1_SMHI-RCA4 R5-G2 2033 2026 2056 2041 2066 
IPSL-IPSL-
CM5A-MR 
IPSL-IPSL-CM5A-MR_r1i1p1_SMHI-
RCA4 
R5-G4 2023 2021 2042 2035 2054 
MOHC-
HadGEM2-ES 
MOHC-HadGEM2-ES_r1i1p1_SMHI-
RCA4 
R5-G5 2021 2018 2037 2030 2051 
MPI-M-MPI-
ESM-LR 
MPI-M-MPI-ESM-LR_r1i1p1_SMHI-RCA4 R5-G3 2034 2028 2064 2044 2067 
Source: JRC, 2019. 
The ISIMIP Fast-track scenarios are described below. 
Table 2: ISI-MIP scenarios used in the spill-over analysis and their years of specific warming levels 
GCM 
1.5C 2C 3C 
RCP 4.5 RCP 8.5 RCP 4.5 RCP 8.5 RCP 8.5 
GFDL-ESM2M 2055 2040 2144 2055 2085 
HADGEM2-ES 2033 2027 2048 2039 2057 
IPSL-CM5A-LR 2018 2015 2034 2030 2050 
MIROC-ESM-CHEM 2027 2023 2042 2035 2053 
NORESM1-M 2044 2035 2081 2052 2075 
Source: JRC, 2019. 
For each scenario, three to five hydrological models from the ISIMIP project were applied (dbh, h08, matsiro, 
mpihm, pcrglobwb). Some hydrological models were not run in all climate scenarios with RCP 4.5, so in total 
42 scenarios are run. 
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Annex 2: POLES-JRC description 
POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems) is a global energy model covering the entire 
energy system, from primary supply (fossil fuels, renewables, ..) to transformation (power, biofuels, hydrogen) 
and final sectoral demand. International market and prices of energy fuels are simulated endogenously. Its 
relatively high level of regional detail (66 countries or regions) and sectoral description (see Figure 11) allows 
assessing a wide range of energy and climate policies in all regions within a consistent global frame: access 
to energy resources, taxation policy, energy efficiency, technological preferences, etc. POLES usually operates 
on a yearly basis up to 2050 or 2100 and is updated yearly with recent information (2015 data for most 
series). Differences with other exercises done with the POLES model by JRC in other projects, or by other 
entities (namely the University of Grenoble and Enerdata) can come from different model version, historical 
data sets, parameterisation, or policies considered. 
The JRC POLES version developed and used in the Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2018 has been used for 
this exercise and is described in (Després et al., 2018). It includes climate change impacts on energy demand 
in residential and services buildings. For this study, impacts on electricity production have been added (see 
Annex 3). The model has been used in a "static" mode, i.e. scenarios were run only until 2020 with future 
climate situations applied with a linear transition from 2015 (historical climate) to 2020 (future climate). This 
is supposed to isolate the climate change impacts from the socio-economical changes that occur along the 
century, the mitigation policies, the adaptation measures or the impact of gradual development of air 
conditioning in many countries. Climate models are compared based on their specific warming levels (1.5, 2 
and 3 degree) even if they do not happen at the same 30-year period. In a separate analysis, the model is run 
in dynamic scenarios along the century. This includes climate mitigation, adaptation and socio-economical 
changes.  
The climate impacts, whether in the static mode for 1.5, 2 and 3 degree warming, or in dynamic scenarios for 
2050, are obtained by comparison of two sets of scenarios that model or not the impacts on electricity 
production, everything else being equal. 
Figure 11: POLES model general scheme 
 
Source: JRC, 2018. 
Final demand 
The final demand evolves with activity drivers, energy prices and technological progress. The following sectors 
are represented: 
- industry: chemistry (energy uses and non-energy uses are differentiated), non-metallic minerals, steel, other 
industry; 
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- buildings: residential, services (specific electricity uses are differentiated, different types of buildings are 
considered); 
- transport (goods and passengers are differentiated): road (motorcycles, cars, light and heavy trucks – 
different engine types are considered), rail, inland water, international maritime, air domestic and 
international; 
- agriculture. 
Complementary information on the impact of climate on residential buildings is given in the section 
"Methodology" above. 
Power system 
The power system describes capacity planning of new plants and operation of existing plants for 40 
technologies. 
The planning considers the existing structure of the power mix (vintage per technology type), the expected 
evolution of the load demand, the production cost of new technologies, and resource potential for renewables.  
The operation matches electricity demand considering the installed capacities, the variable production costs 
per technology type, the resource availability for renewables. 
The electricity demand curve is built from the sectoral distribution over 12 representative days (at hourly 
time-step) obtained by a clustering algorithm applied on several years of load, wind and solar load curves for 
each country or region. 
Electricity price by sector depend on the evolution of the power mix, of the load curve and of the energy taxes 
(by default kept constant). 
Other sectors 
The model also describes other energy transformations sectors: liquid biofuel (BTL), coal-to-liquid (CTL), gas-
to-liquid (GTL), hydrogen (H2), direct air capture. 
Oil supply 
Oil discoveries, reserves and production are simulated in 80 individual countries and for 6 types of fuel: 
conventional crude & NGLs (inland and shallow water), tar sands, extra heavy oil, oil shale (kerogen), 
deepwater and arctic oil. 
The capital and operational costs of production are represented in detail. The market is structured between 
large producers, small producers and demand markets. The global Reserve / Production ratio is monitored. 
Price to consumer considers the evolution of taxation, including the impact of a carbon value. 
Gas supply 
Gas discoveries, reserves and production are simulated in 80 individual countries or regions for 4 types of 
gas: conventional gas (inland and shallow water), shale gas, deepwater and arctic gas. They supply 15 
regional markets, made up of the national gas demand of the 57 countries and regions. 37 of the producers 
are considered as key producers with a capacity to export on international markets through trading routes. 
Gas transport is done through inland pipeline, offshore pipelines or LNG. 
Gas price is simulated for 3 regional markets: Europe, America, Asia. It depends on the transport cost, the 
regional R/P ratio (long-term trend), the evolution of oil price and the development of LNG (integration of the 
different regional markets). Price to consumer considers the evolution of taxation, including the impact of a 
carbon value. 
Coal supply 
Coal production is simulated in 74 individual countries or regions. Some countries (USA, Australia, China, India) 
have two or more production regions to better represent transportation costs which can represent a 
significant share of the coal delivery cost. They supply 15 regional markets, made up of the national coal 
demand of the 57 countries and regions. 26 of the producers are considered as key producers with a capacity 
to export on international markets through trading routes. 
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Coal delivery price for each route depends on the transport cost (international and inland), the mining cost, 
and other operation costs. An average delivery price is calculated for each of the 15 consuming markets. The 
model also calculates an average international price for 3 "continental" markets: Europe, Asia, America. Price 
to consumer considers the evolution of taxation, including the impact of a carbon value. 
Biomass supply 
The model differentiates 3 types of primary biomass: energy crops, short rotation crop (cellulosic) and wood 
(cellulosic). They are described for each of the 57 country through a potential and a production cost curve – in 
the case of SRC and wood this is derived from look-up tables provided by the specialist model GLOBIOM-G4M 
(Global Biosphere Management Model).  
Biomass can be traded, either in solid form or as transformed liquid biofuel. 
Wind, solar and other renewables 
These renewables are associated to potentials per country, which can be more detailed (in the case of wind 
and solar, where supply curves are used) or less (hydro, geothermal, ocean where only a potential figure is 
used). 
GHG emissions 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are derived directly from the energy balance, that is influenced by 
mitigation policies (carbon value, support policies to technologies, energy efficiency targets). 
Other GHGs from energy and industry are simulated using activity drivers identified in the model (sectoral 
value added, mobility per type of vehicles, fuel production,..) and abatement cost curves. 
GHG from agriculture and LULUCF are derived from GLOBIOM-G4M lookup tables. 
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Regional coverage 
Table 3: POLES-JRC regional coverage (66 countries and regions, incl. 28 EU Member States) 
Europe and CIS America 
Africa and Middle 
East 
Asia Oceania – Pacific 
Detailed EU Canada Egypt Japan Australia 
United Kingdom USA Morocco & Tunisia Korea, Rep. New-Zealand 
Switzerland Mexico Algeria & Lybia China 
Rest of pacific 
countries 
Norway Brazil South Africa Indonesia  
Iceland Chile 
Rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa 
India  
Turkey Argentina 
Mediterranean 
Middle East 
Vietnam  
Rest of central 
Europe (incl. 
Balkans) 
Rest of Central 
America 
Saudi Arabia Thailand  
Russia 
Rest of South 
America 
Iran Malaysia  
Ukraine  Rest of Gulf 
Rest of South-East 
Asia 
 
Rest of CIS   Rest of South Asia  
Source: JRC, 2019. 
Annex 3: Details of the climate impact modelling methodology 
Climate scenarios considered 
A total of 22 climate scenarios are studied, based on 11 climate models from the EURO-CORDEX database 
and two sets of climate projections (RCP 4.5 and 8.5). The climate indicators used are the daily average 
values of near-surface air temperature, bias-adjusted (Dosio and Paruolo, 2011, Dosio et al., 2012, Dosio, 
2016, Dosio, 2018), the bias-corrected near-surface wind speeds and the river runoff (discharge for each cell, 
in m3/s). While the air temperatures and the winds are direct outputs from EURO-CORDEX climate models, the 
river runoff is computed with the LISFLOOD 2.0 hydrological model (Van Der Knijff et al., 2010). LISFLOOD is 
a GIS-based spatially-distributed hydrological rainfall-runoff model. Based on several climate variables such 
as bias-corrected precipitations and temperatures, the LISFLOOD model calculates a complete water balance 
at a daily time step simulating the most important physical processes (e.g. surface runoff, infiltration, 
evapotranspiration) for every grid-cell (5x5km). LISFLOOD has been applied at European, African or global 
scale for applications of flood projections (Alfieri et al., 2017) or of climate change impact assessments 
(Bisselink et al., 2018).  
The data used in the spill-over study were downloaded and treated like the EURO-CORDEX data, for both RCP 
4.5 and 8.5. The ISIMIP Fast track project has five Global Climate Models7; we selected five hydrological 
                                           
7 One of the ISIMIP Fast-track global climate model (IPSL-CM5A-LR) is almost identical to a EURO-CORDEX 
GCM (IPSL-IPSL-CM5A-MR) 
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models for the water analysis on each of these GCMs. Therefore, there are 10 scenarios for wind speeds and 
temperatures and 42 scenarios for water runoff (some hydrological models were not run in all climate 
scenarios with RCP 4.5). The geographical detail of all of these scenarios is global but do not use the same 
grid as the EURO-CORDEX scenarios8. 
Data treatment 
The model used, POLES, describes each day with representative days, chosen by a clustering algorithm 
applied on load, wind and solar conditions for each country. Each representative day is described in terms of 
temperature and seasons (summer, winter and swing season components). Therefore, each set of climate 
data is translated into seasonal patterns at the country scale (or regions of POLES), which are then used to 
characterise each representative day and observe the impacts of climate change. The input climate data are 
also averaged in 30-year time windows. 
The daily temperature data is thus translated into a temperature for each representative day and at the 
country level, like in PESETA III (the population density is used as the weighting factor). This temperature then 
evolves based on the climate change scenarios.  
Wind speeds (at 10 m height) are averaged at the country level with non-constant weightings describing both 
current and potential future wind turbines9. The data is also aggregated at the seasonal scale for use in 
POLES representative days. 
Finally, water runoff is also averaged at the country level with weightings that consider the position of current 
plants for each main energy source (hydro, biomass, coal, gas, nuclear, oil)10. The river-cooled power plants 
referenced by Enerdata were used for the weightings (see Figure 12). The data is also used as seasonal 
averages. 
Figure 12: Power plants registered in the Enerdata database 
Note: only the plants that are more distant from the coast than 10 km are considered, to account for the 
approximations of coordinates and of the coastline precision. 
 
Source: Enerdata, 2019. 
The weightings chosen for the treatment of each dataset is subject to some uncertainty but is not expected to 
change considerably the results. 
                                           
8 While ISIMIP uses 0.5 degree grid cells, EURO-CORDEX scenario data are described with 5 km cells for hydro 
(Lambert azimuthal equal-area projection) and about 10 km for temperatures and winds (rotated grid). 
9 Potential sites are determined by considering sites of good resource and adequate population density (i.e. 
with floor and ceiling values). 
10 The power plant weights are the installed capacity for each European grid cell, provided that the computed 
distance between the plant and the coast is more than 10 km. 
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Impacts considered 
In PESETA III, the climate change impacts on energy demand were studied, namely on energy for heating and 
for cooling in the residential sector. The PESETA IV project changes focus and analyses some impacts on 
power supply (van Vliet 2016, Tobin 2018). These impacts are singled out by only considering the relative 
differences of production of each electricity source with and without climate change impacts on electricity 
production (all else being equal, including impacts on energy demand). 
Solar photovoltaics are mostly impacted by the irradiation, which is linked to the number of sunny hours 
(cloud coverage), air turbidity (dust, humidity) or cleanliness of the panel (dust, sand). These are difficult to 
predict, being very location-specific and extremely complex systems. Another well-known factor is the PV 
panel temperature. There is a linear decrease of the efficiency of the panel with increasing temperatures (as 
in Dowling 2013). Although the local wind conditions play a role, in POLES we choose to a minima represent a 
linear link between the PV panel production and outside temperature. 
Wind power is obviously affected by wind speeds (although wind directions could affect some plants in case 
of an unforeseen wake effect). There is a non-linear relation: very low wind speeds do not generate power 
before a cut-in speed that depends on the turbine shape and technology; then the power output evolves with 
the cubic speed of the wind up to a maximum rated output. Finally, if wind speeds are too strong, a cut-off 
speed stops the power generation to protect the turbine from windstorms. In POLES, we only have daily 
average wind speeds so the simplified approach is to use a linear relation between yearly average wind 
speeds and yearly wind production. In principle a variation of the distribution of wind speeds across the year 
could lead to non-linear effects on power production (more storms and more still conditions could result in the 
same average speed but lower production) but the GCM projections do not show any consistent effect on the 
yearly distribution of daily wind speeds compared to the present one, so we consider no change in the 
expected storm or still periods and therefore no measurable non-linear effect linked to the power curve of 
wind turbines. Besides, the onshore wind speeds are also used as a driver of the offshore wind production. 
This could be further refined by using a more precise mapping of country boundaries than the half-degree 
map used for grouping wind data. 
The hydropower potential production is directly impacted by the river discharge (Note that hydro plants 
cannot use the entire runoff because of losses for environmental reasons, e.g. fish lifts, spillway release 
during floods). Hydro power in POLES is split in small hydro, run-of-river, lakes and pumped hydro. Apart from 
pumped hydro storage, hydropower is directly affected by the variations of river runoff. Since the capacity 
factors are usually well below 100%, we neglect the potential overflow that could not be exploited by plants 
because of saturated capacities. For both wind and hydro power, the data provided by the climate and 
hydrological models are daily averages. We aggregate them by season and use them in POLES to describe the 
supply patterns as well as the yearly total production.  
Nuclear and other thermal plants (coal, gas, oil and biomass) use thermodynamic processes where the 
cooling source is essential. Although dry cooling technologies exist, they are a minority as of today and 
thermal plants usually use water, which makes them vulnerable to hot and dry climates, especially those that 
are situated on rivers (sea-side plants are less affected and their impacts are not considered here). Indeed, 
thermal plants usually have constraints set by environmental regulations in order to preserve part of the 
natural flow of the rivers, with a minimum run-off and a maximum water temperature (low river flow or high 
river temperature are dangerous for fauna and flora). To respect these constraints, thermal plants have to 
reduce output or shut down when water is too scarce and/or warm. Their availability for power production is 
thus reduced. To evaluate this, we combine temperature data (translated to water temperatures with the 
affine relation of Mima and Criqui, 2015) and runoff data, aggregated at the seasonal and national scale, to 
determine when the environmental limits start to affect the national available power. The cooling technology 
(once-through or recirculating towers) and the design of any particular plant make a difference in their water 
needs, whether consumed (evaporated) or abstracted (and given back to the river, warmer). The 
environmental limits that we use have to be a national average of river temperatures and runoffs so they are 
approximate: downstream water temperature inferior to 28 degree Celsius (see Figure 13), share of water 
consumed and abstracted less than 5% and 50% of total run-off respectively. 
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Figure 13: Availability constraints on thermal plant output linked to air and water temperatures 
 
Source: JRC, 2019. 
One should note that the typical values used in POLES as thresholds of temperature and share of runoff that 
is withdrawn or consumed could actually be less strict in regions that have anticipated such conditions and 
are specially adapted to it. 
Our modelling assumptions also mean that all impacts are felt at all plants, independently from the other 
plants of the country. There is no cross-effect or coupling of plants that would sit on the same river (e.g. 
retiring half of the national plants will not decrease the climate impact for the remaining plants).  
Thermal plants with dry cooling technology also have an impact of the air temperature on their efficiency, 
particularly at high temperatures (see Figure 14). 
Figure 14: Efficiency losses of thermal plants due to dry cooling 
 
Source: JRC, 2019. 
 
Modelling: model setting and limitations 
The study first applies climate change conditions to the 2020 energy system, in a "static" analysis. This 
implies that the power system operation faces the direct climate impacts, but the longer-term dynamics of 
new investments (mitigation measures, socio-economic evolutions) and adaptation techniques (cooling 
technologies in power plants, air conditioning development) are ruled out. We only report the relative 
differences of electricity production between scenarios that do and do not take climate impacts into account. 
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In the second part of the study, we use a global climate dataset in order to compares scenarios with climate 
impacts on the global energy sector with scenarios that only affect the European energy sector; this allows 
looking at the spill-over effects from the rest of the world on Europe. 
In a third section, the POLES model is used in its original setting, with dynamic scenarios up to 2050. Socio-
economic conditions follow the Ageing report 2015 and technical developments are in the same line as the 
GECO 2018 report (Keramidas et al., 2018). The energy sector reacts to climate mitigation policies (efforts are 
consistent with a 2°C global warming) and climate change (in line with a 2°C world, following RCP 4.5). This 
includes energy demand adaptation with air conditioning, energy efficiency and energy supply transition to 
more sustainable technologies (fuel switch, development of renewables, etc.). Only the differences in 2050 
between scenarios with and without climate impacts on electricity production are analysed (all else being 
equal). 
Finally, the dynamic scenarios are used with an additional option of cooling technology adaptation for nuclear 
and other thermal plants. This is used when the corresponding technologies face water constraints. The 
reported impacts follow the same logic, by comparing in 2050 the results of scenarios with climate change 
impacts on electricity supply and adaptation with scenarios without climate impacts on electricity production. 
A caveat of this analysis is that all climate impacts are applied together, so impacts on individual technologies 
are not assessed separately. For example, the wind or solar power impacts are negligible when combined with 
impacts on hydro or thermal plants. The smaller impacts on some technologies do not always show because 
of the many other impacts:  
- other technologies may be more impacted;  
- prices and demand also evolve in response to climate impacts on production; 
- production has to match demand so some technologies may balance variations of other technologies. 
This does not mean that these technologies face no impact, but rather that in the electricity system their 
impacts are dominated by other impacts.  
The intrinsic limitations of the model are its temporal and geographical granularity. The model runs at yearly 
time-steps, each year being composed of six representative days of unequal weights, driven by different 
electricity load, wind and solar conditions. The six-day representation therefore introduces some significant 
variability of the temperatures, wind speeds and water availability, with seasonal characteristics showing. 
However, the extreme and exceptional events such as droughts and floods are not accounted for; only the 
more general tendencies are observed (e.g. lower water availability in summer), including a degree of diversity 
of situations (e.g. summer and winter patterns, days of high electricity demand, days of low wind speeds, etc.).  
The geographical representation at the country level also has its limitations. The temperatures, wind speeds 
and water availability conditions have to be averaged at the country level; using weighting factors allows 
accounting for the current system geographical distribution. However, this does not consider future evolutions 
of these distributions (like the position of future plants) nor local meteorological impacts (e.g. local heat wave, 
wind conditions, floods or droughts). 
The consequence of these limitations is that the model cannot assess the climate change impacts of an 
extreme weather event on a specific plant. What we assess is the evolution of climate impacts linked with 
tendencies at the seasonal and national scale. 
Finally, the climate impacts included needed some modelling simplifications. The following linear 
approximations were necessary in this exercise: 
- Water runoff and hydro production: where saturation and water spillage is assumed proportional to 
inflow, so that increased water inflow implies increased hydro production; 
- Wind speeds and power production: a single wind turbine has a non-linear power curve (with cut-in 
speed, a cubic relation, a maximum rating and a cut-off speed) but at the national scale and based 
on daily averages of wind speeds, the relation is more difficult to characterize; 
- Irradiation and solar PV production: the heat accumulation at solar panels is not accounted although 
in practice it could have a multiplier effect on ambient temperatures; 
- Air and water temperatures: results show a lower role of water temperatures on thermal production 
restrictions compared to water runoff, but this result may change with a more precise description of 
water temperatures. 
These approximations are necessary in a long-term energy system model like POLES but could be improved 
by using inputs from more detailed models, on the technical and geographical description of electric plants.  
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- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. 
Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see 
https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 
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